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Michigan v. Lucas: Failing to Define the State Interest in Rape
Shield Legislation
In the modem American courtroom, rape trials present a clash be-
tween the defendant's right to a fair trial and the complainant's right to
privacy. During the twentieth century a defendant's right to present evi-
dence has grown, overcoming common-law and statutory restrictions. 2
Similarly, the rights of the complainant in a rape case to be free of gender
stereotyping, harassment, and the embarrassment engendered by the ad-
mission of evidence of her sexual history have surfaced despite contrary
common-law principles.3 From a host of sources, including public opin-
ion, media attention, and statutory definitions of sexual assault, these
rights come into play in an arena that focuses on the victim and her
behavior in a way wholly foreign to proceedings for nonsexual offenses.4
To combat defense strategies that draw on stereotypes and to other-
wise protect complainants, all fifty states and the federal government
have adopted evidentiary limitations shielding rape complainants from
such tactics.5 In Michigan v. Lucas 6 the trial court prevented the defend-
1. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 573-82 (1961) (detailing history of the com-
mon law's transition from a rule of a defendant's incompetency to testify to a rule of
competency).
2. See infra notes 55-84 and accompanying text.
3. Under the traditional common-law rationale, evidence of a complainant's chastity was
relevant to issues of credibility and consent. See, e.g., J. Alexander Tanford & Anthony J.
Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 544, 546-
51 (1980). Sir Matthew Hale's often-quoted statement that rape" 'is an accusation easily to be
made.., and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent,'" illustrates
early judicial perceptions of female sexuality. Id. at 546 (quoting 1 MATrHEW HALE, THE
HIsToRY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 634 (Philadelphia, R.H. Small 1847)). Evidence of a
complainant's sexual history was admitted as material because of the common belief that an
unchaste woman was likely to consent to any sexual act. Id. at 546-48. Furthermore, promis-
cuity was viewed as a "form of dishonesty" that could be used to impeach the complaining
witness. Id. at 549. These views persisted among legislators and judges into the early 1970s.
Id. at 550 n.23.
4. See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1094-1105 (1986) (explaining that the
absence of a mens rea requirement in American definitions of rape necessarily shifts the inves-
tigation from what the defendant did to how the victim acted, particularly whether the victim
resisted the defendant and whether the victim consented); Barbara Fromm, Sexual Battery:
Mixed-Signal Legislation Reveals Need for Further Reform, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 579, 579,
591-93 (1991) (detailing statements from the Florida jury that acquitted a defendant charged
with rape because of the manner in which the complainant had been dressed and discussing
how socialization leads jurors to blame the victim for the rape); Barbara Kantrowitz, Naming
Names, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 29, 1991, at 26, 31 (reporting results of poll indicating that 57% of
Americans think negatively of a woman if they know she has been raped).
5. Andrew Z. Soshnick, Comment, The Rape Shield Paradox: Complainant Protection
Amidst Oscillating Trends of State Judicial Interpretation, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
644, 644 nn.l-3 (1987); see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-203 (1986); CAL. EVID. CODE § 782
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ant from offering "potentially relevant" 7 testimony because he failed to
notify the prosecution of his intent to introduce evidence of the com-
plainant's prior sexual history as required by the Michigan rape shield
law. The United States Supreme Court upheld the exclusion, rejecting
the defendant's argument that the Sixth Amendment prevented the trial
judge from excluding the evidence of prior sexual conduct.'
This Note explores the tension between the state interest in rape
shield legislation9 and the rights of criminal defendants to confront wit-
nesses and present evidence.10 It then describes the attempt to use exclu-
sionary legislation to ameliorate the perceived gender bias affecting
judicial determinations regarding consent to sex.'1 The Note concludes
that because the Court merely asserted that the state purpose in protect-
ing complainants is valid, it failed to describe adequately that purpose,
even though it is crucial to the balance between the defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights and the goals of rape shield laws. 2
This controversy arose when Nolan K. Lucas was charged with
(West Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347 (West 1987); N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW
§ 60.42 (McKinney 1981); N.C. R. EvID. 412.
Commentators have argued that these statutes violate the Sixth Amendment Compulsory
Process Clause because the legislation provides that certain types of evidence are per se inad-
missible, precluding any exercise of discretion by the trial court. A legislative determination
that an entire category of evidence is irrelevant or overly prejudicial may prevent a defendant
from cross-examining the complainant about relevant evidence. See generally Harriett R. Gal-
vin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts A Proposal for the Second Decade,
70 MINN. L. Rlv. 763, 802-12 (1986) (suggesting model statute to remedy this problem);
Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 3, at 566-89 (illustrating situation in which prior sexual his-
tory may be relevant); David Haxton, Comment, Rape Shield Statutes: Constitutional Despite
Unconstitutional Exclusions of Evidence, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1219, 1255-71 (exploring the Sixth
Amendment criticisms and concluding that rape shield laws are constitutional). Yet, courts
consistently have upheld such legislation on the basis that the excluded evidence was irrelevant
or highly prejudicial. See, eg., People v. Comes, 80 Ill. App. 3d 166, 175, 399 N.E.2d 1346,
1352-53 (1980); State v. Miller, 449 So. 2d 1361, 1364 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 450 So. 2d
965 (La. 1984); see also Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Constitutionality of "Rape Shield" Statute
Restricting Use of Evidence of Victim's Sexual Experience, 1 A.L.R. 4th 283, 292-301 (1979 &
Supp. 1991) (compiling judicial responses to constitutional challenges to rape shield laws).
6. 111 S. Ct. 1743 (1991).
7. The defendant sought to offer testimony of past sexual conduct between himself and
the complainant. Id. at 1745. The Michigan rape shield statute provides that evidence of the
victim's past sexual conduct with the actor may be admissible if, during an in camera hearing
prior to trial, the judge determines that the proposed evidence is relevant to a material issue
and its prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value. MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.520j (West 1979).
8. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. at 1748.
9. See infra notes 55-84 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 85-144 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 153-92 and accompanying text.
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third-degree criminal sexual conduct."3 At trial the complainant testified
that Lucas attacked her, forced her into his apartment at knifepoint, beat
her, forced her to perform fellatio, and forced her to have sexual inter-
course.14 Lucas's defense was consent; he stated that the complainant
voluntarily participated in sex and that he did not use any force. 5 The
complainant and the defendant had been girlfriend and boyfriend for
nearly seven months, but had broken up two weeks before the incident
occurred.1 6 Lucas sought to introduce evidence of their past sexual rela-
tionship, despite his failure to comply with the notification requirements
of Michigan's rape shield statute.1 7 The trial court denied the defend-
13. People v. Lucas, 160 Mich. App. 692, 693, 408 N.W.2d 431, 431 (1987), remanded,
433 Mich. 878, 446 N.W.2d 291 (1989). Michigan law defines third-degree criminal sexual
conduct as "sexual penetration with another person... if... (b) [florce or coercion is used to
accomplish the sexual penetration. Force or coercion includes but is not limited to any of the
circumstances listed in section 520b(1)(f)(i) to (v)." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520d
(West 1979) (footnote omitted). These circumstances, listed in § 520b(l)(f), include:
(i) When the actor overcomes the victim through the actual application of phys-
ical force or physical violence.
(ii) When the actor coerces the victim to submit by threatening to use force or
violence on the victim, and the victim believes that the actor has the present ability to
execute these threats.
(ii) When the actor coerces the victim to submit by threatening to retaliate in
the future against the victim, or any other person, and the victim believes that the
actor has the ability to execute this threat.
Id. § 750.520(1)b(f)(i)-(iii).
Although the Women's Task Force on Rape supported this statute, one prominent com-
mentator has criticized it on the grounds that it invites traditionally masculine interpretations
of force. Estrich, supra note 4, at 1147-57. Professor Estrich noted that the statute does not
make nonconsent an element of the defense, perhaps to convey the message that "lawful sex
[is] inconsistent with violence ... or that consent in such circumstances is meaningless." Id. at
1155-56. The Michigan courts, however, have read nonconsent back into the statute by con-
sidering consent a defense. People v. Thompson, 117 Mich. App. 522, 526, 324 N.W.2d 22, 23
(1982); People v. Jansson, 116 Mich. App. 674, 682, 323 N.W.2d 508, 512 (1982); People v.
Hearn, 100 Mich. App. 749, 755, 300 N.W.2d 396, 398 (1980). Professor Estrich also identi-
fied types of coercion that the statute fails to envision. Estrich, supra note 4, at 1154-57. For
example, while including an assailant's future threats against a third person as adequate coer-
cion of the immediate victim, the statute fails to include present threats to injure a third per-
son; furthermore, the statute's "schoolboy-fight definition of force" invites a traditional
interpretation and excludes other forms of coercion, such as threatening to fire a woman from
her job or to destroy her property or reputation. Id.
14. People v. Lucas, 160 Mich. App. 692, 693-94,408 N.W.2d 431,431 (1987), remanded,
433 Mich. 878, 446 N.W.2d 291 (1989).
15. Id. The legal consent standard applied in the context of rape is often criticized by
feminist scholars. See infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
16. People v. Lucas, 160 Mich. App. 692, 693, 408 N.W.2d 431, 432 (1987), remanded,
433 Mich. 878, 446 N.W.2d 291 (1989).
17. Id. at 694, 408 N.W.2d at 432. The rape shield statute provides:
(1) Evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct, opinion evidence of
the victim's sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the victim's sexual conduct
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ant's motion without holding an in camera hearing to determine if the
proposed evidence was relevant or prejudicial."8
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.19 The
court examined the governmental purpose behind both the rape shield
shall not be admitted under sections 520b to 520g unless and only to the extent that
the judge finds that the following proposed evidence is material to a fact at issue in
the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its proba-
tive value:
(a) Evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct with the actor.
(b) Evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or origin
of semen, pregnancy, or disease.
(2) If the defendant proposes to offer evidence described in subsection (1)(a) or (b),
the defendant within 10 days after the arraignment on the information shall fie a
written motion and offer of proof. The court may order an in camera hearing to
determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible under subsection (1). If new
information is discovered during the course of the trial that may make the evidence
described in subsection (1)(a) or (b) admissible, the judge may order an in camera
hearing to determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible under subsection
(1).
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520j (1979).
This statute was upheld under the United States Constitution in People v. Arenda, 416
Mich. 1, 330 N.W.2d 814 (1982). The Arenda majority stated that the legislative determina-
tion that evidence of a victim's sexual history is irrelevant or highly prejudicial is, in most
cases, rational and reasonable. Id. at 10-11, 330 N.W.2d at 817. The state interests in remov-
ing deterrents to the reporting and prosecution of sexual offenses and in protecting the victim's
privacy are "significant." Id. The dissent acknowledged the policy behind the rape shield
legislation, but concluded that the statute violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights to
confrontation because "[t]he relevancy and prejudicial effect of evidence are determined by the
issues raised at trial, not by the crime charged." Id. at 20, 330 N.W.2d at 821 (Kavanagh, J.,
dissenting).
In a critique of this statute, Leo A. Farhat and Richard C. Kraus argued that the dissent
in Arenda pinpoints the crucial problem with this law. Leo A. Farhat & Richard C. Kraus,
Michigan's "Rape-Shield" Statute Questioning the Wisdom of Legislative Determinations of
Relevance, 4 COOLEY L. REV. 545, 557 (1987). They maintained that "sound legislative policy
... did not translate into a well-drafted statute" because the legislation eliminated the flexibil-
ity of judicial discretion to evaluate the "unlimited variety of legal and factual issues" that may
arise. Id. at 546-47, 551. The article points out that in response, the Michigan courts have
read many exceptions into the statute that do not appear in the text. Id. at 548-54. Despite
their criticisms, Farahat and Kraus recognized that rape shield statutes are important "public
symbol[s]," and that restrictive exclusionary statutes were passed because of a distrust of
judges' use of their discretion. Id. at 556-57; see also Women and Violence: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on Legislation to Reduce the Growing Problem of Violent Crime
Against Women, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 66-67 (1990) (evidencing continued gender-bias among
judges in dealing with sexual offenses).
18. People v. Lucas, 160 Mich. App. 692, 694-95, 408 N.W.2d 431,432 (1987), remanded,
433 Mich. 878, 446 N.W.2d 291 (1989). At trial defense counsel did not make the motion
within the 10-day period because she was not appointed to the case until one week prior to the
trial. Joint Appendix for Brief On Writ of Certiorari to the Michigan Court of Appeals at 7,
Lucas (No. 90-149) [hereinafter Joint Appendix].
19. People v. Lucas, 160 Mich. App. 692, 696, 408 N.W.2d 431, 433 (1987), remanded,
433 Mich. 878, 446 N.W.2d 291 (1989).
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statute generally and the ten-day notice requirement in particular.2" It
determined that the exclusion was "clear legal error" because neither the
"interests sought to be protected by the rape shield statute" nor the
state's interest in truth seeking was compromised by the defendant's fail-
ure to comply with the notice requirement. 21 Because Lucas and the
complainant had a lengthy relationship that had ended shortly before the
incident occurred, the court believed the evidence offered was "consider-
ably ... probative." 2
20. Id. at 694-96, 408 N.W.2d at 432.
21. Id. at 696, 408 N.W.2d at 432. The court stated that "where the proposed testimony
relates to sexual activity between the complainant and the defendant," the aims of the rape
shield statute are not involved. Id. (citing People v. Perkins, 424 Mich. 302, 307-08, 379
N.W.2d 390, 392-93 (1986) (affirming,the trial court's admission of evidence of recent sexual
activity between the complainant and defendant because of its similarity to the alleged act)).
The court failed to address how exploring a seven-month sexual relationship avoids implicat-
ing the interest in protecting the complainant against harassment and unnecessary invasion of
her privacy. See Arenda, 416 Mich. at 9-11, 330 N.W.2d at 816-17 (discussing the purposes
served by Michigan's rape shield statute).
The opinion relied heavily on People v. Williams, 95 Mich. App. 1, 289 N.W.2d 863
(1980), rev'd on other grounds, 416 Mich. 25, 330 N.W.2d 823 (1982), in which the same court
determined that when the defendant offers evidence of prior sexual conduct between himself
and the complainant there is no justification for a 10-day notice requirement. Providing notice
to allow the prosecution to investigate the validity of the defendant's claim
"is sound when applied to notices of alibi and insanity defenses. It loses its logical
underpinnings however when applied to the instant situation.... [T]he very nature
of the evidence presented.., is personal between the parties. As such, it does not
involve a subject matter that requires further witnesses to develop."
People v. Lucas, 160 Mich. App. 692, 694, 408 N.W.2d 431, 432 (1987) (quoting Williams, 95
Mich. App. at 10-11, 289 N.W.2d at 866-67), remanded, 433 Mich. 878, 446 N.W.2d 291
(1989). The Williams court concluded that, because there is no valid justification for the rape
shield law when the defendant offers evidence of sexual conduct between himself and the com-
plainant, the exclusion of such evidence violated Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation and
cross-examination. Williams, 95 Mich. App. at 10, 289 N.W.2d at 864. The Lucas court
implicitly recognized the constitutional violation when it adopted the reasoning which backed
the holding in Williams.
22. People v. Lucas, 160 Mich. App. 692, 694, 408 N.W.2d 431, 432 (1987), remanded,
433 Mich. 878, 446 N.W.2d 291 (1989). The court alluded to a presumption of consent in an
ongoing relationship. The Model Penal Code (MPC) espouses this doctrine in its justification
of the martial rape exception:
The existence of a prior and continuing relation of intimacy, whether formalized by
ceremony or achieved by long practice, is not irrelevant to the concerns of the law of
rape.... [Marriage or equivalent relationship, while not amounting to a legal waiver
of the woman's right to say "no," does imply a kind of generalized consent that dis-
tinguishes some versions of the crime of rape from parallel behavior by a husband.
The relationship itself creates a presumption of consent, valid until revoked.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. 8(c) (1980) (emphasis added).
The MPC extends the marital rape exception to married couples who are informally sepa-
rated, and to "persons living together as man and wife." Id. § 213.6 cmt. 3. Several states
have extended the exception to cover unmarried cohabitants. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-
67(b) (1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4 (West Supp. 1991); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3103
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The prosecution appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court, which,
in lieu of granting certiorari, remanded the case to the court of appeals to
determine whether the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to
introduce evidence of prior sexual conduct was harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.2" On remand the court of appeals reiterated the impor-
tance of the recently terminated "boyfriend and girlfriend" relationship
between the defendant and the complainant to the issue of consent.24
Furthermore, the court added that the excluded evidence went to credi-
bility and thus its exclusion was not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.25
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 26 and vacated
the judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals.2 7 The Court held that
the Michigan court erred in concluding that the exclusion of evidence
under the state rape shield law violated Lucas's federal constitutional
rights.2" Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor interpreted the ap-
pellate court's holding as setting forth a per se rule that would prohibit
preclusion of evidence of prior sexual conduct between a defendant and a
complainant even when the defense fails to follow the rape shield stat-
(Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-1(2) (1984). Professor Catharine MacKinnon viewed this
development as "a legal adjustment to the social fact that acceptable heterosexual sex is in-
creasingly not limited to the legal family.... [I]ndices of closeness, of relationship ranging
from nodding acquaintance to living together, still contraindicate rape." CATHARINE A.
MAcKiNNON, TOWARDS A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 176 (1989). The effect of the
continuing consent doctrine is that "courts look for even greater atrocities than usual to under-
mine their assumption that if sex happened, she wanted it." Id. For a critical view that this
exception violates women's constitutional rights, see Note, To Have and to Hold: The Marital
Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1255, 1262-72 (1986).
23. People v. Lucas, 433 Mich. 878, 878, 446 N.W.2d 291, 292 (1989).
24. People v. Lucas, 469 N.W.2d 435, 436 (1990), vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 1743
(1991).
25. Id. This conclusion questions the legislative policy behind the rape shield statute and
holdings of the Michigan Supreme Court. "[T]here is no logical nexus between a complain-
ant's reputation for unchastity ... and the character trait for truthfulness or untruthfulness."
People v. Hackett, 421 Mich. 338, 352, 365 N.W.2d 120, 126 (1984); see also People v. Wil-
liams, 416 Mich. 25, 36-40, 330 N.W.2d 823, 827-29 (1982) (holding that evidence of prior
sexual conduct was not relevant to credibility or the issue of consent in the context of victim's
alleged consent to group sexual encounter with four men). The idea that evidence of a wo-
man's sexual activity goes to her credibility has its roots in the societal encouragement of
female sexual passivity. See SusAN S.M. EDWARDS, FEMALE SEXUALITY AND THE LAV 23-
36 (1981). Professor MacKinnon argued that "[m]en's pervasive belief that women fabricate
rape charges" is a result of the failure of men to consider the meaning of sexual encounters to
women. MAcKINNON, supra note 22, at 181; see infra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
26. 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990).
27. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. at 1748.
28. Id.; for a discussion of the Michigan Court of Appeals' implicit reliance on the Sixth
Amendment, see supra note 21; infra note 49.
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ute.29 According to the Court, this per se rule undervalued the state
interest involved because "a trial court would be unable to preclude past
sexual conduct evidence even where a defendant's failure to comply with
the notice-and-hearing requirement is a deliberate ploy to delay the trial,
surprise the prosecution, or harass the victim."3
The Court's analysis focused on whether precluding the sexual-con-
duct evidence violated Lucas' Sixth Amendment rights to present evi-
dence in his defense and to confront adverse witnesses.31 The opinion
first established that the right to present a defense and to confront wit-
nesses is not absolute and may be limited " 'to accommodate other legiti-
mate interests in the criminal trial process.' "32 For example, the Court
has recognized valid limitations on the right to cross-examination in or-
der to eliminate harassment, prejudice, and confusion of issues; to pro-
tect witnesses' safety; and to exclude repetitive or "'marginally
relevant'" interrogation.3
Justice O'Connor then compared the Michigan rape shield statute's
notice and hearing requirement with other valid notice requirements.34
To meet constitutional standards, the restrictions must not be "'arbi-
trary or disproportionate'" to a legitimate state interest.35 The Court
analogized Michigan's rape shield statute to alibi statutes, which require
that a criminal defendant notify the state prior to trial of any alibi wit-
nesses he intends to call.36 The Court has upheld alibi statutes because
29. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. at 1745-46; see infra notes 48-54 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of the dissenting Justices' disagreement with the majority's characterization of the
court of appeals' holding.
30. Lucas, Ill S. Ct. at 1746.
31. Id. The relevant portion of the Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to... be confronted with the witnesses against him;
[and] to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor .... ." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. Provisions of the Sixth Amendment are applicable to state prosecutions. Pointer
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965). See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text for the Lucas
dissent's argument that the Michigan Court of Appeals' holding was based on evidentiary
rather than Sixth Amendment grounds.
32. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. at 1746 (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987); Cham-
bers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)).
33. Id. (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)); see infra notes 106-
27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the development of this standard.
34. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. at 1747-48.
35. Id. at 1747 (quoting Rock, 483 U.S. at 56). The Court did not consider whether the
Michigan requirement that the defendant file his motion within 10 days of arraignment, the
shortest filing period in the nation, is too restrictive. Id. The Michigan Court of Appeals had
not addressed this issue, choosing instead to decide the case on other grounds. Id; see supra
notes 19-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of the holding of the Michigan Court of
Appeals.
36. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. at 1747. In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), the Supreme
Court held that notice-of-alibi statutes did not violate the Constitution because they merely
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they "'enhance[] the fairness of the adversary system,'" and thus pro-
mote a legitimate state interest.37 The interests supported by Michigan's
rape shield law-including protecting victims from harassing or irrele-
vant interrogation about their sexual history3 ---are, the Court held,
equally legitimate.39
Finally, the majority held that a per se rule that prohibits the exclu-
sion of evidence of prior sexual conduct between the defendant and com-
plainant is inconsistent with its previous cases.' For example, when a
defendant violates a valid discovery rule, the Court has held that proba-
tive evidence may be precluded"1 and, in certain circumstances, a preclu-
sion sanction42 may be appropriate.43 The Court vacated the judgment
and remanded the case to the Michigan courts to determine if the preclu-
sion was justified on the facts of the case.'
"compelled [the defendant] to accelerate the timing of his disclosure." Id. at 85. The states
have a legitimate interest in promoting truth seeking by avoiding an "eleventh-hour" defense.
Id. at 81.
37. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. at 1747 (quoting Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973) (con-
sidering notice-of-alibi rules)).
38. Id. at 1745. Curiously, the Court failed to mention the interest in increased reporting
and prosecution of sexual offenses, which is one of the primary purposes behind the Michigan
statute and most rape shield legislation. See People v. Arenda, 416 Mich. 1, 9-10, 330 N.W.2d
814, 816-17 (1982); Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 3, at 566-67.
39. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. at 1746. Because the statute at issue did not completely bar the type
of evidence offered by the defendant (prior sexual conduct between defendant and complain-
ant), the Court was not forced to address the constitutionality of the statute's per se exclusion
of other types of evidence. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West 1979). Lucas is
the first case in which the Supreme Court has considered the state interest underlying rape
shield legislation.
40. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. at 1747. For example, in Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988), the
Court specifically rejected the defendant's argument that under the Sixth Amendment "preclu-
sion [of evidence] is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation." Id. at 414.
41. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. at 1747-48 (citing United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 241 (1975)
(holding that the trial court properly prohibited the defendant from presenting expert testi-
mony based on a written report because the defense refused to submit a copy of the report to
the prosecution; the sanction "assur[ed] compliance with [the court's] order")).
42. A "preclusion sanction" punishes the defense for failing to comply with a rule of court
by excluding the evidence offered in violation of the rule. See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 401-02.
43. Lucas, 111 U.S. at 1748. In Taylor the trial court imposed a preclusion sanction in
response to the defendant's repeated willful violations of discovery rules. Taylor, 484 U.S. at
405, 417. In Lucas the defendant claimed the violation was merely negligent. Lucas, 111 S.
Ct. at 1748; see supra note 18. For a discussion of the development of the preclusion sanction,
see infra notes 112-44 and accompanying text.
44. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. at 1748. The Court stated: "We express no opinion as to whether or
not preclusion was justified in this case. The Michigan Court of Appeals ... did not address
whether the trial court abused its discretion on the facts before it." Id. At trial the judge
simply consulted the rape shield statute and ruled that since its requirements had not been
met, he would exclude the evidence. Joint Appendix at 7-8, Lucas (No. 90-149). The statute
provides no direction for the trial judge in the event that the requirements are not met. In
Lucas the trial judge did not consider whether a failure to comply within the 10-day period
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Concurring in the judgment, Justice Blackmun argued that he
would uphold the use of a preclusion sanction for violation of a rape
shield statute, but not for violation of a general reciprocal-discovery
rule.45 He compared the rape shield legislation to notice-of-alibi rules,
describing the state interest as "a legislative attempt to identify a kind of
evidence," whereas the goal of reciprocal-discovery rules is truth seek-
ing.46 He argued that the state's interest in specific discovery rules may
be advanced by use of a preclusion sanction, but with general discovery
rules the preclusion may be disproportionate to the goals of the
legislation.47
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Marshall,
arguing that Lucas did not present the question whether a state may
never preclude evidence because of a defendant's failure to comply with
the notification requirements of a rape shield statute.48 Instead, he main-
tained, it posed the much narrower question whether the statute as ap-
plied in this case infringed upon Lucas's Sixth Amendment right to
present relevant evidence.49 While the lower court's opinion may not be
because new counsel had been appointed after the period ran should be treated differently from
willful noncompliance. Id. In People v. Hackett, 421 Mich. 338, 365 N.W.2d 120 (1984), the
Michigan Court of Appeals explained that the rape shield statute provides legislative guidance,
but that the "determination of admissibility is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial
court." Id. at 349, 365 N.W.2d at 125. Arguably, under Hackett, the trial court did not
exercise its discretion at all.
45. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. at 1748-49 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). Reciprocal-
discovery rules allow for general discovery between the prosecution and the defense with equal
burdens on each side. Justice Blackmun dissented in Taylor, which upheld a preclusion sanc-
tion for willful violation of a reciprocal-discovery rule. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 438 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
46. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. at 1749 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Blackmun
drew this same distinction in Taylor. See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 438 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
47. Lucas, I1l S. Ct at 1749. (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). Thus, precluding
evidence under a general discovery rule would fail to meet the standard set out in Rock v.
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), which requires that the limitation be neither arbitrary nor dis-
proportionate to the state interest. Id. at 55-56; see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
The distinction between specific and general discovery rules has been criticized because
specific discovery rules, which serve to provide early identification of types of evidence to be
proffered, also aid in truth seeking. See John W. Heiderscheit, III, Taylor v. Illinois: The New
and Not-So-New Approach to Defense Witness Preclusion Sanctions For Criminal Discovery
Rule Violations, 23 GA. L. REv. 479, 483-84 n.28 (1989) (noting the popularity of Justice
Blackmun's view among lower courts but questioning its validity). Heiderscheit asked, "Is it
not clear, for example, that a reciprocal exchange of witness lists is always less protective than
disclosing an intention to invoke the insanity defense... [?]" Id. Similarly, in camera hear-
ings to determine the relevancy and prejudicial effect of evidence of prior sexual history allow
rape cases to go to the jury stripped of gender bias, thus affecting truth seeking. In any event,
the majority in Taylor erased the bright-line distinction between general and specific discovery
rules when it upheld a preclusion sanction for violation of a general discovery rule. Id.
48. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. at 1749-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that while the Michigan court men-
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clear, Justice Stevens contended, it does not prescribe the per se rule de-
scribed by the majority.50 The statute's ten-day notice requirement, he
stated, was unduly restrictive."1 Furthermore, Justice Stevens agreed
with the Michigan Court of Appeals that the in camera hearing require-
ment served no useful purpose in this situation because the evidence
likely would be assessed in a contest of the defendant's word against the
complainant's; accordingly, the jury, not the judge, should assess the par-
ties' credibility. 2 Arguing that the Michigan holding did not go so far as
to prevent the preclusion of evidence as "an exceptional response to an
exceptional case,"53 Justice Stevens suggested that a situation such as one
in which the violation of the discovery rule was a tactical move would be
exceptional.54
In the late 1970s and early 1980s 5 several factors prompted the
adoption of federal56 and state rape shield legislation. Legal reformers
sought to accelerate the erosion of traditional judicial perceptions about
rape victims.5 7 Historically, the fear of false accusations of rape has led
judges and juries to doubt women's charges.58 These doubts arose from
tioned neither the Constitution nor any federal cases it did rely heavily on People v. Williams,
95 Mich. App. 1, 289 N.W.2d 863 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 416 Mich. 25, 330 N.W.2d
823 (1982), which turned on the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and cross-examina-
tion issues. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. at 1750 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Yet Justice Stevens failed to
recognize that Williams also held that "[tihe hearing requirement retains its constitutional
validity only in situations involving previous sexual conduct between a complainant and third
persons." Williams, 95 Mich. App. at 10, 289 N.W.2d at 866. Thus, if the notice-and-hearing
requirements are unconstitutional as applied to offers of evidence of prior sexual conduct be-
tween the complainant and the defendant, then excluding the evidence for failure to comply
with those requirements can never be allowed.
50. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. at 1749 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "The fact that a state court's opin-
ion could have been written more precisely than it was is not.., a sufficient reason for either
granting certiorari or requiring the state court to write another opinion." Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
51. Id. at 1750 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, like the Michigan Court of Appeals,
failed to consider that some evidence of prior sexual conduct between the defendant and the
complainant may not be probative of consent; thus the in camera hearing would still serve the
interests of avoiding harassment and unnecessary embarrassment as well as that of limiting the
influence of gender bias. See id. at 1746; supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
53. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. at 1751 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); see, eg., Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 415 (1988)
(describing instance in which defense attorney violated discovery rule in order to prevent the
State from finding a rebuttal witness).
55. See Soshnick, supra note 5, at 644 n.l.
56. FED. R. EVID. 412.
57. Courts had begun to reject reputation and opinion evidence of prior sexual conduct
before legislatures enacted rape shield statutes. See infra note 148.
58. An early American opinion illustrates the prevailing fear that women falsely charged
rape as a means to revenge: "There is no [other] class of prosecutions attended with so much
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the suspicion that sexually active women deliberately lie:
The unchaste (let us call it) mentality finds... expression in the
narration of imaginary sex incidents of which the narrator is
the heroine or the victim. On the surface the narration is
straightforward and convincing. The real victim, however, too
often in such cases is the innocent man; for the respect and
sympathy naturally felt by any tribunal for a wronged female
helps to give easy credit to such a plausible tale.59
As illustrated by advice from Judge Ploscowe, magistrate court judge in
New York City during the 1950s, that "[p]rosecuting attorneys must
continually be on guard for the charge of sex offense brought by the
spurned female that has as its underlying basis a desire for revenge, or a
blackmail or [is a] shakedown scheme,"'  such views became entrenched
in judicial responses to rape.61
Legal commentators also discredited rape complainants' testimony
because they believed that women fantasized sexual encounters.62 The
Freudian school of psychology buttressed this view by espousing theories
of feminine masochism. 63 Feminine rape fantasies were touted as evi-
dence that women desire to be raped to "gratif[y] ... deep-seated maso-
danger, or which afford so ample an opportunity for the free play of malice and private ven-
geance." People v. Benson, 6 Cal. 221, 223-24 (1856). Into the 1970s juries were instructed to
be wary of the complainant's testimony: "Where the complaining witness and the defendant
are the only witnesses, a charge of rape is one which, generally speaking, is easily made, and
once made, difficult to disprove. Therefore, I charge you that the law requires that you ex-
amine the testimony of the prosecuting witness with caution." DAVID E. AARONSON, MARY-
LAND CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND COMMENTARY § 4.32, at 155 (1975); see BAR
ASSOCIATION OF THE DISTRICr OF COLUMBIA, CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, instr. no. 101 (1966); 2 VICTOR HEMPHILL, ILLINOIS JURY IN-
STRUCTIONS § 4535, at 370 (1951). This perception remains a strong social force: 40% of
college males and 15% of college females surveyed agreed that "[i]n order to protect the male,
it should be difficult to prove that a rape has occurred." ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED
IT RAPE 46 (1988).
59. 3A JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 924a, at 736 (James H. Chadboum ed., rev. ed.
1970).
60. Morris Ploscowe Sex Offenses: The American Legal Context, 25 LAW & CONTEMP.
PRoBs. 217, 223 (1960).
61. See, eg., People v. Benson, 6 Cal. 221, 223-24 (1856); Camp v. State, 3 Ga. 417, 420
(1847); see supra note 58.
62. See, eg., 3A WIGMORE, supra note 59, § 924a, at 737 ("No judge should ever let a sex
offense charge go to the jury unless the female complainant's social history and mental makeup
have been examined and testified to by a qualified physician.").
63. Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 28 (1977) (drawing on feminist and modem psychoanalytic challenges to
Freudian views of women, e-g., Christian David, A Masculine Mythology of Femininity, in
JANINE CHASSEGUET-SMIRGEL, FEMALE SEXUALITY: NEW PSYCHOANALYTICAL VIEWS 47,
47-83 (1970)).
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chistic needs. ' 64 Relying on these theories, legal commentators argued
that "normal" women are ambivalent about sex and that their words and
actions thus are not an accurate indicator of their desires; "often their
erotic pleasure may be enhanced by, or even depend upon, an accompa-
nying physical struggle."' 65 Thus, courts admitted evidence of prior sex-
ual conduct to allow the defense to demonstrate false charges.
Proponents of rape shield legislation hoped to expunge the theory of
"ongoing consent." This theory originated as a moral judgment that,
because unchaste women were presumed to "yield to almost any man
willingly,",6 6 evidence of their sexual history showed a propensity to-
wards sex and indicated their likely consent to any encounter. 7
Although this view has been discredited as sexual mores have changed, 68
it continues to influence jury verdicts.69 Furthermore, marital rape ex-
ceptions and other statutory limitations of rape in ongoing sexual rela-
tionships shift the theory from suggesting that when a woman consents
to sex with any man she consents to sex with every man, to suggesting
that when a woman consents to sex with one man she consents to every
64. Id. Courts have not given credence to views of sadomasochistic behavior in the bat-
tery context. See People v. Samuels, 250 Cal. App. 2d 501, 513-14, 58 Cal. Rptr. 439, 447
(1967) ("[A] normal person in full possession of his mental faculties does not freely consent to
the use, upon himself, of force likely to produce great bodily injury."), cert denied, 390 U.S.
1024 (1968); Commonwealth v. Appleby, 380 Mass. 296, 309, 402 N.E.2d 1051, 1060 (1980)
(holding that beating with a riding crop "must be construed to be inapplicable to private,
consensual conduct of adults").
65. Note, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Objectives of
the Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 66 (1952) (citing SIGMUND FREUD, NEW INTRODUC-
TORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS 158 (W.J.H. Sprout trans., 1933); LEON J. SAUL, EMO-
TIONAL MATURITY 139 (1947)). Professor Estrich suggested that this note was the most
influential of all commentary on the consent standard affecting the Model Penal Code provi-
sions on rape into the 1970s. Estrich, supra note 4, at 1128-29 & n.128.
66. Berger, supra note 63, at 21. Condemnation of sex outside marriage as "moral turpi-
tude" allowed defendants to use evidence of sexual history to impeach complainants' credibil-
ity. Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 3, at 546. This tactic proved difficult to justify, because
sexual history was inadmissible to impeach male witnesses or female complainants charging
crimes other than sexual offenses. Id. at 549 & nn.19-21.
67. Berger, supra note 63, at 21.
68. See, eg., Commonwealth v. Manning, 367 Mass. 605, 613-14, 328 N.E.2d 496, 501
(1975) (Braucher, J., dissenting) (remarking that evidentiary rules regarding evidence of the
victim's sexual history represent a "part of a legal tradition, established by men, that the com-
plaining woman in a rape case is fair game for character assassination in open court" and the
"logical underpinnings of this law are shaky in the extreme"); see infra note 148 and accompa-
nying text.
69. One study reported that when the defense presented evidence that the victim "en-
gaged in sex outside marriage" jurors were less likely to believe in the defendant's guilt. Gary
D. Lafree et al., Jurors' Responses to Victim's Behavior and Legal Issues in Sexual Assault
Trials, 32 Soc. PROBs. 389, 397 (1985).
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sexual encounter with that man.7 °
Reformers also promoted rape shield laws as a means of protecting
complainants from a "second rape" in the courtroom. Proponents of
these statutes argued that evidence of prior sexual conduct is not only
irrelevant, but also an invasion of the victims' privacy.71 The embarrass-
ment and humiliation suffered by complainants cause psychological dam-
age that affects the victims' self-esteem, supporters claimed.72 Yet critics
of rape shield laws attack this position as an illegitimate "emotional"
appeal.73 Opponents are suspicious of granting to rape victims who tes-
tify against their attackers any special protection that is not available to
other crime victims.74
Finally, rape shield legislation attempts to eradicate gender-bias in
the determination of consent. Feminist scholars have argued that women
are socialized to react passively to male sexual aggression, thus creating
differing perceptions of the quality and nature of consent. 75 The problem
lies in
the rape law's assumption that a single state of affairs existed,
one which merely needs to be determined by evidence, when
many.., rapes involve honest men and violated women. When
the reality is split-a woman is raped but not by a rapist?-the
law tends to conclude that a rape did not happen.76
The legal conflict is embodied in the determination of whose subjective,
70. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. The theory remains important because
every rape shield statute allows evidence of prior sexual conduct between the defendant and
complainant under certain evidentiary circumstances; see infra note 145.
71. See, eg., 124 CONG. REC. 34,912 (1978) (statement of Rep. Mann). Speaking in sup-
port of the federal rape shield law, Representative James R. Mann of South Carolina stated:
Such evidence quite often serves no real purpose and only results in embarrassment
to the rape victim and unwarranted public intrusion into her private life.
... Federal evidentiary rules permit a wide ranging inquiry into the private
conduct of a rape victim, even though that conduct may have at best a tenuous con-
nection to the offense for which the defendant is being tried.
Id. (statement of Rep. Mann).
72. Berger, supra note 63, at 23-24.
73. Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 3, at 550.
74. Id. The focus on embarrassment and humiliation, however real and damaging, places
women in a special class that requires protection. In contrast, characterizing rape shield legis-
lation as a means to address gender-bias in rape law alleviates the need to single out women as
a protected class. See infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
75. E.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Towards
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNs 635, 654 (1983).
76. Id. Professor MacKinnon contended that the law "sees and treats women the way
men see and treat women," thus "the way the male point of view frames an experience is the
way it is framed by state policy." Id. at 644.
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gendered view becomes "what happened."'7 7 This difficulty is exacer-
bated, feminists have noted, by popular eroticism of "masculine" domi-
nance and "feminine" submission.78
The bias has affected judicial and legislative requirements to prove
the absence of consent. The common law required that women demon-
strate their lack of consent by the "most vehement exercise of every
physical means or faculty within the woman's power to resist the pene-
tration of her person,"7 9 persisting throughout the duration of the at-
tack.80 Although rape statutes reduced the requirement to "earnest
resistance,"8" in most states crying and verbal pleas to stop did not con-
stitute earnest resistance.8 2 This consent standard placed a burden on
rape victims greater in kind and degree than that on victims of any other
crime."3 In response, feminist critics argued that the law must empower
77. Id. at 652-64. Professor MacKinnon concluded that an objective view of consent can
be achieved only in a relationship between partners of equal power. Id. at 652. As gender
relationships presently exist, "consent is a communication under conditions of inequality. It
transpires somewhere between what the woman actually wanted and what the man compre-
hended she wanted." Id. Robin Wiener has attempted to address these problems by advocat-
ing a shift of the communications burden onto men, requiring them to seek overt consent.
Robin Wiener, Shifting the Communication Burden: A Meaningful Consent Standard in Rape,
6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 143, 155-61 (1983).
78. MAcKINNON, supra note 22, at 177-79. Professor MacKinnon argued that in a soci-
ety in which "dominance is eroticized,] ... force and desire are not mutually exclusive"; thus
"consent" is a concept with little meaning. Id. at 177-78.
79. Brown v. State, 127 Wis. 193, 199, 106 N.W. 536, 538 (1906).
80. E.g., Moss v. State, 208 Miss. 531, 536, 45 So. 2d 125, 126 (1950) (en banc); People v.
Dohring, 59 N.Y. 374, 386 (1874); King v. State, 210 Tenn. 150, 158, 357 S.W.2d 42, 45
(1962); Brown, 127 Wis. at 199, 106 N.W. at 538 (holding that the victim's struggles and
"inarticulate" screams did not meet the court's requirement of "utmost resistance").
81. See, eg., HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-700(11) (Supp. 1985); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 510.010(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.305(2) (1991); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-67.6 (Michie 1988) (providing that resistance not required, but absence of resist-
ance relevant to whether sex was "against the will" of the complainant); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9A.44.010(5) (West 1988); see also MODEL PENAL CODE ANN. § 213.1 cmt. 4 (1980)
("This is not to say that consent by the victim is irrelevant or that inquiry into the level of
resistance by the victim cannot or should not be made. Compulsion plainly implies non-con-
sent, just as resistance is evidence of non-consent.").
82. E.g., State v. Lima, 2 Haw. App. 19, 22, 624 P.2d 1374, 1377 (1981), rev'd, 64 Haw.
470, 643 P.2d 536 (1982) (reversing because of evidence that the victim had pushed the
defendant).
83. See generally Lucy R. Harris, Comment, Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of
Rape, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 613, 635-45 (1976) (comparing requirements to show consent and
the interests protected in different crimes). Putting up a sign negates consent to trespass; when
a trespasser ignores a verbal warning to stop, the Model Penal Code treats the crime as aggra-
vated. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2(2) (1980) (defiant trespasser). Defensive arguments that
the victim's "passive assent" or "passive submission" constituted consent in robbery cases have
consistently failed. See State v. Natalie, 172 La. 709, 716, 135 So. 34, 36 (1931) (entrapment of
warehouse thieves); State v. Neely, 90 Mont. 199, 209, 300 P. 561, 565 (1931) (entrapment of
cattle thief). When a criminal suspect requests that the police not question him, his rights
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women to grant or withhold consent by eliminating from the law the
existing myths and misconceptions of women's sexuality.8"
The gender-bias in judicial determinations of rape complaints illus-
trates the need for rape shield legislation; however, the debate over these
laws asks not only whether the state interest is valid, but also whether
these laws infringe on defendants' constitutional rights. At the source of
this debate is the continuing tension between defendants' efforts to pres-
ent the strongest defense available to them and the states' efforts to estab-
lish a framework for the adversarial system. Cross-examination is vital
to the defense in a rape case because the victim is often the only witness.
The right of defendants in state court to cross-examine witnesses was
ensured by Pointer v. Texas."5 In Pointer the Court unanimously held
that the right to confrontation and cross-examination is fundamental and
"essential to a fair trial."18 6 As a result, states' attempts to limit the evi-
must be respected and the questioning must end, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74
(1966); a woman, however, must show more than a simple "no" to prove lack of consent to
sex. Presumptions of consent do not exist in crimes involving property, even when the victim's
behavior seems to invite the taking. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMI-
NAL LAW § 8.7, at 753 (2d ed. 1986) (finding keys in the ignition not a defense to larceny;
entering open door not a defense to trespass).
The respect for the autonomy of medical patients is embodied in consent standards. The
informed-consent standard for medical battery requires a physician to respect that "each man
is considered to be the master of his own body." Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 406, 350
P.2d, 1093, 1104, clarified and reh'g denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960). The patient's
viewpoint is increasingly given more deference to protect the "patient's fundamental right of
physical self-determination." 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons and Other Healers § 189
(1981). In the area of sterilization, patients' rights are afforded even greater protection. Doc-
tors face felony charges for failing to abide by detailed consent guidelines before performing
sterilizations. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-271 to -275 (1990); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2974 to -
2980 (Michie 1991).
After an exhaustive review of consent standards in other areas of the law, Professor Es-
trich concluded that the unique treatment of consent in the rape context shows "all too
plain[ly] that the purpose of the consent rule is not to protect female autonomy and freedom of
choice, but to assure men the broadest sexual access to women." Estrich, supra note 4, at
1122.
84. See MAcKINNON, supra note 22, at 183; Estrich, supra note 4, at 1131-32.
85. 380 U.S. 400 (1965). The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "[iun all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against him."
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
During the preliminary hearing a robbery victim named Phillips identified Pointer as one
of his assailants. The defendant Pointer was not represented by counsel at the hearing and did
not attempt to cross-examine Phillips. Phillips moved to California before trial and the state
sought to use the hearing transcript of his testimony. Defense counsel objected that to permit
its introduction would prevent the defendant from confronting the witness. Pointer, 380 U.S.
at 401.
86. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 403. The Justices disagreed over whether the Sixth Amendment
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, or whether due process requires a
right to confrontation independent of the Sixth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment
simply guarantees that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
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dence a defendant may present are required to comport with the Sixth
Amendment rights.8 7
A number of state evidentiary rules have failed to pass muster under
the Sixth Amendment. In Washington v. Texas,88 for example, the Court
struck down a state statute which prohibited persons charged as princi-
pals, accomplices, or accessories to the same crime from testifying for
each other.89 Only the defendant, Washington, and his accomplice,
Fuller, knew which of them had fired the fatal shot.90 The defendant
testified that an intoxicated Fuller grabbed the gun and fired the shot.91
Fuller would have corroborated this evidence, but the statute precluded
him from testifying.92 The Court examined the state interest behind the
rule and determined that it
due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Justice Black, writing for the majority,
and Justice Goldberg, in his concurrence, agreed that the Sixth Amendment right is subsumed
within the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 407; id. at 410 (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring). Justices Harlan and Stewart believed reliance on the Sixth Amendment is not necessary.
Id. at 408 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 410 (Stewart, J., concurring). Rejecting the incorpo-
ration theory, Justice Harlan explained that the Court could rest its decision solely on the
Fourteenth Amendment because the "right to confrontation is 'implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty' reflected in the Due Process Clause." Id. at 408 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quot-
ing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). He noted that adopting either view would
yield identical results for the defendant Pointer; the constitutional underpinnings, however,
would affect future development. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
87. See also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318-19 (1974) (holding that defendant was
denied his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him when court issued a
protective order preventing disclosure of witness's juvenile court record for purposes of im-
peachment; defendant's right to confrontation overrode the state policy of protecting juvenile
offenders); Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131-33 (1968) (holding that defendant was denied
his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him when court sustained prosecu-
tion's objections to disclosure of witness's correct name and address). Professor Galvin based
her criticism of exclusionary rape shield laws on Davis. See Galvin, supra note 5, at 804-08.
She compared Alaska's juvenile shield law, designed to further the rehabilitative goals of the
juvenile justice system by preventing embarrassing disclosures of juveniles' records, to rape
shield laws, which are designed to increase reporting and prosecution of rapes by protecting
complainants from embarrassing sexual disclosures. Id. at 804-05. She distinguished the two
types of shield laws because rape shield laws also "generally promote[] accurate fact-finding."
Id. at 806. She concluded that in some situations in which prior sexual history would be
relevant, the defendants' Sixth Amendment rights must prevail over the goals of rape shield
statutes. Id. at 807-08.
88. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
89. Id. at 15. The statute cited by the Court provided:
Persons charged as principals, accomplices or accessories, whether in the same or by
different indictments, cannot be introduced as witnesses for one another, but they
may claim a severance; and, if one or more be acquitted, or the prosecution against
them be dismissed, they may testify in behalf of the others.
Id. at 16-17 n.4 (citing TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 711 (1925)).
90. Id. at 16.
91. Id.
92. Id. The limitation was based on the fear that if two persons implicated in the same
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rested on the unstated premises that the right to present wit-
nesses was subordinate to the court's interest in preventing per-
jury, and that erroneous decisions were best avoided by
preventing the jury from hearing any testimony that might be
perjured, even if it were the only testimony available on a cru-
cial issue.93
Because the rule presumed an entire category of witnesses to be "unwor-
thy of belief," the Court held that the statute arbitrarily denied the de-
fendant his right to present a defense.94
The Court in similar fashion struck down an antiquated Mississippi
common-law rule in Chambers v. Mississippi." The trial court had pre-
vented the defendant from cross-examining a witness who had confessed
to the crimes with which the defendant was charged, but later recanted
the confessions. 9s The defense called the witness and the trial court ap-
plied the common-law rule that a party may not impeach his own wit-
ness.97 The state failed to offer any valid justification for the rule;
instead, it relied on a technical argument that since the defendant had
called the witness he was not "adverse," and Chambers therefore had no
right of confrontation." The Court rejected this argument on grounds
that the right of cross-examination "helps assure the 'accuracy of the
truth-determining process,' 99 and thus may be limited only by legiti-
mate interests. °°
The Court reiterated the importance of the right to cross-examina-
crime were permitted to testify on behalf of each other, " 'each would try to swear the other
out of the charge.'" Id. at 21 (quoting Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 335 (1892)).
93. Id. at 21. The Court recognized that the "'truth is more likely to be arrived at by
hearing the testimony of all persons of competent understanding who may seem to have
knowledge of the facts involved in a case, leaving the credit and weight of such testimony to be
determined by the jury."' Id. at 22 (quoting Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471
(1918)).
94. Id. at 22-23. The Court also noted that the exceptions to the rule increased its arbi-
trariness. Coparticipants in crimes were not prohibited from testifying for the prosecution:
"Common sense would suggest that [a coparticipant] often has a greater interest in lying in
favor of the prosecution .... " Id. at 22.
95. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
96. Id. at 291.
97. Id. at 295. The rule is based on the presumption that the party who calls the witness
"'vouches for his credibility.'" Id. (quoting Clark v. Lansford, 191 So. 2d 123, 125 (Miss.
1966)).
98. Id. at 297. The Court criticized this rationale for failing to consider the realities of a
criminal trial, in which exculpatory evidence often comes from hostile witnesses. Id. at 297-
98.
99. Id. at 295 (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)).
100. Id. The Court also held that the "mechanical[]" application of hearsay rules had
deprived the defendant of the right to present all reliable evidence that does not contravene the
generally accepted purpose of the hearsay rules. Id. at 298-302.
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tion to show bias on the part of the prosecution's witness in Delaware v.
Van Arsdall. °10 In Van Arsdall the state offered no compelling interest
served by the limitation on the defendant's right to confront this witness;
instead, the state argued that the exclusion was harmless and that the
convictions should stand."0 2 The Court described the situations in which
the right to confrontation and cross-examination may be limited:
[T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation
Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-
examination based on concerns about, among other things, har-
assment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety,
or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally
relevant. 103
The majority found no valid reason to exclude the cross-examination, but
remanded the case to the Delaware Supreme Court for further considera-
tion of the harmless-error question.1°4
Cases striking down state statutes limiting defendants' rights to
present evidence provided the Court with the standards that exclusionary
rules must meet to comport with Sixth Amendment rights.0 5 The Court
solidified the standard in Rock v. Arkansas, 6 holding that the state may
impose restrictions on the rights to present a defense and confront wit-
nesses so long as they are "not... arbitrary or disproportionate" to the
interest they are designed to effectuate.' 0 7 In an attempt to ensure the
trustworthiness of evidence, the Arkansas Supreme Court had estab-
lished a per se rule prohibiting a defendant's hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony on the grounds that it "tends to be unreliable."'108 On appeal to
101. 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986). In this case the defense was prevented from questioning the
prosecuting witness about his agreement with the state; under the agreement criminal charges
against him were to be dropped in exchange for his testimony. Id. at 676.
102. Id. at 679-80.
103. Id. at 679. Justice O'Connor quoted this language when discussing the validity of
Michigan's rape shield statute and the power of trial courts to exclude evidence. Lucas, 111 S.
Ct. at 1746. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
104. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684.
105. See, eg., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (holding that rules of
evidence may "not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice"); Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967) ("The State arbitrarily denied [the defendant] the right to put on
the stand a witness ... whose testimony would have been relevant and material to the de-
fense." (emphasis added)); see supra notes 88-104 and accompanying text.
106. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
107. Id. at 55-56.
108. Id. at 57. The defendant underwent hypnosis because she could not remember how
the gun had gone off in the shooting for which she was being tried. Id. at 46. After hypnosis
she claimed that she remembered that she did not have her finger on the trigger and that the
gun went off while she was struggling. Id. at 47. The trial court excluded all testimony that
the defendant could not prove was a result of pre-hypnotic memory. Id. On appeal, the Ar-
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the United States Supreme Court, the defendant argued that the trial
court erred because it failed to consider the reasons for the hypnosis, the
circumstances under which it was conducted, or the corroborating evi-
dence. 11 The Court agreed, holding that because the per se rule did not
take into account the actual circumstances, it arbitrarily excluded the
evidence.' 10 Because the state had failed to repudiate the validity of all
hypnotically refreshed testimony, the Court concluded that the rule arbi-
trarily limited the defendant's right to testify. 11
Whenever it has considered the constitutional propriety of limiting a
criminal defendant's rights to present a defense and confront witnesses,
the Court consistently has focused on the validity of the state interest and
the means used to protect that interest.' 12 This same focus appears in
cases determining the validity of discovery rules and the preclusion sanc-
tion. Williams v. Florida 3 presented the Court with the issue of
whether a state may force a defendant to disclose, prior to trial, an intent
to rely on an alibi. 11 The Florida statute provided for reciprocal discov-
ery of alibi and alibi rebuttal witnesses and threatened exclusion of the
witnesses' testimony for failure to comply. 5 Because of the rule, the
state was able to depose Williams' alibi witness, focus on inconsistencies
between her deposition and testimony at trial, and find a rebuttal witness
kansas Supreme Court held that "the dangers of admitting this kind of testimony outweigh
whatever probative value it may have" and established a per se rule of exclusion. Id. at 48-49.
109. Id. at 56.
110. Id. at 56-57. Four justices disagreed, finding valid the state purpose in excluding all
hypnotically refreshed testimony because of the scientifically recognized problems with the
actual reliability of hypnosis and the tendency of jurors to overestimate its reliability. Id. at
62-63 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 61. The Court expressly refused to consider the admissibility of hypnotically
refreshed testimony from any witness other than a criminal defendant. Id. at 58 n.15. States
have excluded hypnotically refreshed testimony offered by the prosecution, which is not guar-
anteed the same rights under the Sixth Amendment. E.g., State v. Peoples, 311 N.C. 515, 535,
319 S.E.2d 177, 189 (1984).
112. See, eg., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (holding that legitimate,
not mechanical application of the rules of evidence ensures the fairness of the trial); Washing-
ton v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967) (finding the arbitrary exclusion of relevant and material
evidence unconstitutional); see supra note 105 and accompanying text.
113. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
114. For discussion of the development and use of notice-of-alibi rules, see, e.g, Eric D.
Blumenson, Constitutional Limitations on Prosecutorial Discovery, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 123, 126-50 (1983) (discussing the Williams holding); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Crim-
inal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279, 285-95 (argu-
ing in favor of criminal discovery); Lori A. Irish, Alibi Notice Rules: The Preclusion Sanction
as Procedural Default, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 254, 257-61 (1984) (providing an overview of fed-
eral and state alibi notice rules).
115. Williams, 399 U.S. at 80.
RAPE SHIELD LAWS
to contradict her story.116 While the Court did not deal with the validity
of the sanction, it did address whether the statute violated the privilege
against self-incrimination. "I The analysis the Williams Court developed
to determine if Florida's alibi rule violated the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination provided the basis of the Lucas Court's
inquiry into whether Michigan's rape shield rule violated the Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation." 8
Again the Court investigated the state interest furthered by the stat-
ute. The majority found that the interest in preventing fabrication of
alibis at the last minute served the broad function of "enhanc[ing] the
search for truth in . . . criminal trial[s]." ' 19 The Court noted that
"[g]iven the ease with which an alibi can be fabricated, the State's inter-
est in protecting itself against an eleventh-hour defense is both obvious
and legitimate."' 2 The Court rejected the defendant's argument that the
notice-of-alibi rule had the effect of granting to the state a continuance to
investigate an alibi claim.' 2 ' Chief Justice Burger concurred, adding that
notice-of-alibi rules serve the additional purpose of disposing of cases in
the pretrial stage because they alert prosecutors to iron-clad defenses and
deter defendants from raising false alibis.' 22
The Court revisited notice-of-alibi rules in Wardius v. Oregon,'23 in
which it held that an Oregon statute that did not provide for reciprocal
discovery rights violated the Due Process Clause.' 24 The Court did not
116. Id. at 81.
117. Id. at 83 n.14. At trial the defendant sought a protective order to waive the require-
ments of the notice-of-alibi rule, as permitted "[ftjor good cause shown." Id. at 80 n.6. When
his motion was denied, the defendant complied with the rule. Id. at 80-81.
118. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
119. Williams, 399 U.S. at 81-82. For criticism of this holding, see Note, The Preclusion
Sanction-A Violation of the Constitutional Right to Present a Defense, 81 YALE L.J. 1342,
1353-64 (1972).
120. Williams, 399 U.S. at 81.
121. Id. at 85-86. The majority also argued that the rule only forces the defendant to
present information at an earlier time period, not to divulge information that would not other-
wise come out at trial. Id. at 83-84. Justice Black disagreed, pointing out that the defendant
need only respond to the state's case. Id. at 1l-14 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). He argued that the state's interest in truth seeking is subordinate to the interest in
protecting the defendant from state power. Id. (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
122. Id. at 105-06 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
123. 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
124. Id. at 472. The statute, which remains in Oregon's codified statutes substantially un-
changed, provides:
(1) If the defendant in a criminal action proposes to rely in any way on alibi
evidence, he shall, not less than five days before the trial of the cause, file and serve
upon the district attorney a written notice of the purpose to offer such evidence,
which notice shall state specifically the place or places where the defendant claims to
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address the constitutionality of the exclusionary rule itself, but focused
instead on the apparent unfairness of imposing notice requirements on
criminal defendants without assigning reciprocal obligations to the
state.12 Although the Court considered the state's interest in truth seek-
ing legitimate, it held that the lack of reciprocity did not further this
end.126 The state offered no additional, significant interest to support this
element of its rule.127
The Court finally addressed the constitutionality of the preclusion
sanction directly in United States v. Nobles.128 Before admitting the testi-
mony of an investigator who had interviewed witnesses and prepared a
report for the defense, the trial judge ordered the defendant to produce
the report for inspection; the judge also stipulated that the report would
be edited in camera and provided to the prosecution. 29 The defendant
refused to comply with the order and the trial court prohibited the inves-
tigator from testifying.13 The Court agreed with the trial judge that the
interest in truth seeking required producing the report because it was
highly relevant to the issue of credibility. 31 The defendant argued that
the ruling deprived him of his Sixth Amendment rights to compulsory
process and confrontation. 32 The Court rejected this argument, stating
that "[t]he Sixth Amendment does not confer the right to present testi-
mony free from the legitimate demands of the adversarial system; one
cannot invoke the Sixth Amendment as a justification for presenting
have been at the time or times of the alleged offense together with the name and
residence or business address of each witness upon whom the defendant intends to
rely for alibi evidence. If the defendant fails to file and serve such notice, the defend-
ant shall not be permitted to introduce alibi evidence at the trial of the cause unless
the court for good cause orders otherwise.
(2) As used in this section 'alibi evidence' means evidence that the defendant in
a criminal action was, at the time of commission of the alleged offense, at a place
other than the place where such offense was committed.
OR. REV. STAT. § 135.455 (1991) (formerly codified at § 135.875). The defendant refused to
comply with the statute because of the lack of reciprocity. As a result, the trial judge refused
to allow the defendant and his alibi witness to testify to his alibi. Wardius, 412 U.S. at 472-73.
125. Wardius, 412 U.S. at 471-72.
126. Id. at 474-75.
127. Id. at 476. The state chose to rely on a procedural argument that the state courts
could have interpreted the statute to require the state to reciprocate with the names and ad-
dresses of witnesses it was planning to use to refute the alibi. As written, the statute did not
provide for two-way discovery; the Court held that the "petitioner cannot be faulted for taking
the legislature at its word." Id. at 476-78.
128. 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
129. Id. at 227-29. The defense sought to impeach the prosecution's witnesses with this
testimony.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 231-32.
132. Id. at 241.
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what might have been a half-truth." 133 Furthermore, the Court held, the
preclusion sanction was not arbitrary or disproportionate as a method of
assuring compliance with the court's order. 134
The defendant in Nobles had the option of obeying the court order
at trial and avoiding preclusion. 13  Taylor v. Illinois,1 36 however,
presented a case more similar to Lucas. In Taylor the defendant failed to
comply with a discovery order requesting the names and last-known ad-
dresses of all witnesses the defense planned to call.137 The trial court
excluded the testimony of a witness the defense failed to list even though
it had already allowed the defense to amend its list after trial had be-
gun.1 38 The truth-seeking goals that supported the exclusion of evidence
in Williams and Nobles provided the groundwork for the Court's evalua-
tion of the discovery rule implicated in Taylor.139
The Court found that "the integrity of the adversary process" de-
mands and rests on accurate means of presenting and collecting reliable
evidence."4 The defendant argued that precluding all testimony by an
undisclosed defense witness is so drastic a sanction that it never should
be imposed.141 The Court, however, felt that the interest in judicial in-
tegrity was better served by retaining the possibility of imposing the most
effective sanction and rejected the defendant's argument.142 Instead the
majority proposed a balancing test in which the trial court should weigh
the following factors to determine if preclusion is appropriate: prejudice
to the truth-seeking process, considerations of efficient administration of
133. Id.; see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (discussing the need for
production of evidence to prevent judgments founded on "partial or speculative presentation of
the facts").
134. Nobles, 422 U.S. at 241. Distinguishing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967),
see supra notes 88-94, the Court noted that the trial court did not bar outright the investiga-
tor's testimony; it simply set legitimate standards for its admission. Nobles, 422 U.S. at 241.
135. In a dissenting opinion to Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988), Justice Brennan
distinguished Nobles from Taylor: in Nobles the defendant could cure the problem by turning
the report over to the trial judge, see supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text, while the
defendant in Taylor could not. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 427 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
136. 484 U.S. 400 (1988).
137. Id. at 403.
138. Id. at 403-05.
139. Id. at 411-12. "The 'State's interest in protecting itself against an eleventh-hour de-
fense' is merely one component of the broader public interest in a full and truthful disclosure
of critical facts." Id. at 412 (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81-82 (1970)). For a
prediction of the expansion of the Williams rationale, see Note, supra note 119, at 1342-43
("This decision would seem to confirm the validity of state pretrial notice statutes-requiring,
for example, notice of an intention to raise the defense of alibi, insanity, or self-defense .....
140. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 414-15.
141. Id. at 413-15.
142. Id.
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justice, the reliability of the evidence, and the reasons for noncompli-
ance. 143 In Taylor the Court determined that the defendant's noncompli-
ance was a willful attempt to gain a tactical advantage and that the most
severe sanction was therefore appropriate, even though the prejudice to
the prosecution was remediable."4
The Court's dealings with state exclusionary rules illustrates that
the constitutionality of these issues turns on a balancing of the state and
judicial interests involved and whether the rule in question is overbroad
in relation to those interests. It is important that the state interest be
clearly defined; only then can courts determine whether a rule as applied
to a defendant is legitimate. There is growing confusion in state courts
over the application of rape shield laws because the state interest has not
been clearly defined. The Lucas Court missed a timely opportunity to
comment on how rape shield legislation meshes with Sixth Amendment
rights, to clarify the nature of legitimate state interests in rape shield
laws, and to suggest how far exclusions of evidence may extend to effec-
tuate these interests. Such guidance is sorely needed.
Most state rape shield laws are as restrictive as Michigan's and call
for a hearing to determine admissibility. 145 Yet many strict provisions
143. Id. at 414-15. The Court cited Fendler v. Goldsmith, 728 F.2d 1181, 1188-90 (9th
Cir. 1983), which considered the effectiveness of alternate sanctions, the impact of preclusion
on the evidence at trial and the outcome of the case, the extent of prosecutorial prejudice or
surprise, and whether the violation was willful, as an example of an acceptable test. Taylor,
484 U.S. at 415. For an analysis of the test before and after Taylor, see infra note 169.
144. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 417. The trial judge noted that the defense lawyer lied about when
he discovered the whereabouts of the witness and that he continually ignored discovery orders.
Id. at 404-05 & nn.5-8. In his dissenting opinion Justice Brennan offered a different view of
maintaining judicial integrity. He argued that the preclusion sanction distorts the truth-seek-
ing interest because it excludes otherwise material evidence of innocence. Id. at 419, 423
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan distinguished the rule at issue in Taylor from rules
that exclude evidence based on relevancy. Id. at 424 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The dissent argued that when the defendant bears no personal responsibility for the viola-
tion, the state's interests can be protected by alternate measures. To address reliability, Justice
Brennan suggested that the use of cross-examination could inform the jury of the defense's
failure to disclose the witness, allowing the jury to weigh the evidence and the witness's credi-
bility. Id. at 427-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent also argued that directing contempt
sanctions, disciplinary proceedings, or other punitive sanctions at the non-complying attorney
would be a more effective deterrent than preclusion. Id. at 431-35 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan further stated that the majority's balancing test would create unnecessary
litigation because of its case-by-case approach. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). It also would
create a conflict of interest between attorney and client, he argued, because the attorney would
be in a position to argue, "Don't preclude the defense witness-punish me personally." Id. at
436-37 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
145. See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (Anderson 1986); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9A.44.020 (West 1988); IDAHO R. EVID. 412 (1985); Miss. R. EvID. 412 (1986); see
also Soshnick, supra note 5, at app. (categorizing all rape shield legislation).
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have been judicially relaxed in an ad hoe manner.1" Despite clear statu-
tory language and legislative intent to the contrary, some state courts
have carelessly discounted the importance of the state purpose behind
rape shield rules when faced with constitutional challenges to these
statutes. 1
47
While state courts have made great strides in eliminating the use of
reputation and opinion evidence of unchastity in some situations,14 8
many refuse to apply rape shield legislation on its face, adopting "balanc-
ing tests" that fail to acknowledge state legislatures' intentions to limit
drastically the admissibility of complainants' prior sexual history, opting
instead to "overprotect" the constitutional rights of defendants. 49 Other
146. See infra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
147. See id. Soshnick highlights Connecticut courts as having established a proper balance
between the state interest in protecting complainants and the defendant's Shth Amendment
rights. Soshnick, supra note 5, at 687-89; see, e.g., State v. Daniels, 8 Conn. App. 190, 195, 512
A.2d 936, 939 (1986) (holding that rape shield statute must be interpreted to carry out the
intent of the legislature and to effectuate the policy behind it); State v. Jones, 8 Conn. App. 44,
48, 510 A.2d 467, 469 (1986) (explaining that important policies of the rape shield statute
could be overcome only by evidence offered to show more than "reputation or personal opin-
ion of the victim's sexual conduct").
148. See, e.g., Lynn v. State, 231 Ga. 559, 559, 203 S.E.2d 221, 222 (1974) (holding that
consent to sex with one man does not imply consent to sex with another); Commonwealth v.
Gouveia, 371 Mass. 566, 569-70, 358 N.E.2d 1001, 1004 (1976) (holding evidence of complain-
ant's prior sexual acts inadmissible for impeachment purposes). See generally Kristine C.
Karnezis, Annotation, Modern Status of Admissibility, in Forcible Rape Prosecution, of Com-
plainant's Prior Sexual Acts, 94 A.L.R.3d 257 (1979) (collecting cases discussing admissibility
of prior sexual conduct as to consent, credibility and physical conditions in forcible rape
cases); Kristine C. Karnezis, Annotation, Modern Status of Admissibility, in Statutory Rape
Prosecution, of Complainant's Prior Sexual Acts or General Reputation for Unchastity, 90
A.L.R.3d 1300 (1979) (collecting cases discussing admissibility of prior sexual history as to
consent and credibility in statutory rape cases).
149. Soshnick, supra note 5, at 691; see, e.g., People v. Hackett, 421 Mich. 338, 347-49, 365
N.W.2d 120, 124-25 (1984) (Expanding the statutory language, the court stated that "[t]he fact
that the Legislature has determined that evidence of sexual conduct is not admissible as char-
acter evidence to prove consensual conduct or for general impeachment purposes is not how-
ever a declaration that evidence of sexual conduct is never admissible."); State v. Brown, 636
S.W.2d 929, 933 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (holding that statute creates only a presumption that
the evidence is irrelevant (Missouri abandoned this approach in State v. Jones, 716 S.W.2d.
799, 800 (Mo. 1986) (en banc))), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1212 (1983); State v. LaClair, 121 N.H.
743, 745, 433 A.2d 1326, 1328 (1981) ("[Dlespite the literal language of the statute, the '...
defendant.., must, upon motion, be given an opportunity to demonstrate that due process
requires the admission of... evidence [concerning the past sexual activities of the prosecutrix]
... .' "); State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 59, 426 A.2d 457, 462 (1981) (holding that evidence
offered for purposes restricted by the statute may be admissible at the discretion of the trial
judge); Commonwealth v. Berry, 355 Pa. Super. 243, 253, 513 A.2d 410, 415-16 (1986) (con-
sidering evidence clearly excluded by the statute); Allen v. State, 700 S.W.2d 924, 932 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1985) (stating that the "constitutional right to confront witnesses is fundamental
and is of such importance that a State's interest in protecting a certain class of witnesses from
embarrassment must fall before the right of confrontation and cross-examination" and that
"[t]hus a statute that purports to prohibit completely the introduction of the victim's consen-
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decisions have effectively amended rape shield statutes by creating excep-
tions that allow the introduction of evidence of prior sexual history to
show alternate sources of physical evidence, 150 intent of the defendant, 1 51
and bias of the complainant.152
The holding in Lucas confirms the messages of Williams, Nobles,
and Taylor that the chief factors justifying an evidentiary rule that tends
to impinge on the Sixth Amendment rights of defendants are the legiti-
macy and importance of the state interest underlying the rule. 153 Lucas
teaches that any limitation of those rights must directly advance a legiti-
mate state interest. To identify the state interest at work, the Lucas
Court relied most heavily on analogies to notice-of-alibi rules and recip-
rocal discovery rules, which serve to eliminate surprise tactics and to
buttress the truth-seeking function of the judicial system."54 "Judicial
integrity" requires that compliance with these rules be strictly
enforced. 15
5
Unfortunately, the Lucas Court failed to define fully the breadth of
the state interest in rape shield legislation. While the majority expressly
recognized a valid state interest in excluding immaterial and inflam-
matory evidence and in protecting the complainant from embarrass-
ment, 156 the opinion failed to indicate how far this protection extends.
The Court quoted portions of the Michigan statute concerning the irrele-
vance of prior sexual conduct and the prejudice its admission engen-
ders,157 which suggested that the state interest in rape shield legislation
sual sexual activity with persons other than the defendant is unconstitutional unless given a
judicial gloss requiring" application of a balancing test).
150. People v. Mikula, 84 Mich. App. 108, 113-14, 269 N.W.2d 195, 198 (1978) (reading
statute to allow evidence to explain any physical injury, not merely "semen, pregnancy or
disease"); Commonwealth v. Majorana, 503 Pa. 602, 611, 470 A.2d 80, 85 (1983) (creating an
exception to permit defendant to attack evidence concerning the source of semen).
151. People v. Walker, 81 Mich. App. 202, 207, 265 N.W.2d 82, 85 (1978) (describing
instance in which defendant charged with breaking and entering with intent to commit rape
offered evidence of complainant's unchastity to show his belief that she would be willing),
152. People v. Garvie, 148 Mich. App. 444, 448, 384 N.W.2d 796, 798 (1986) (holding
that, "[n]otwithstanding the statute," evidence of complainant's prior false accusations of
criminal sexual conduct should be admitted); Commonwealth v. Black, 337 Pa. Super. 548,
552-53, 487 A.2d 396, 398-99 (1985) (upholding admission of evidence of complainant's prior
sexual relationship with her brother to show motive for false accusation against father).
153. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. at 1746; see supra notes 85-144 and accompanying text.
154. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. at 1747-48. Justice Blackmun distinguished the state purpose in
specific discovery rules, such as notice-of-alibi rules, from general discovery rules. Id. at 1749
(Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). Commentators, however, have rejected this bright-
line rule. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
155. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 414-15 (1988).
156. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. at 1746-47.
157. Id. at 1747.
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lies in the eradication of juror misperceptions about rape victims to the
extent the misperceptions bias outcomes. In her own words, however,
Justice O'Connor focused on the need for "heightened protection against
surprise, 15 harassment, and unnecessary invasions of privacy,'5 9 sug-
gesting that the state interest in this statute lies solely in the protection of
the complainant."6° Curiously, the Court did not address the state pur-
pose in increasing rape reporting and prosecution described by the Mich-
igan Supreme Court as a valid interest. 16 1 This sketchy definition of state
interest leaves state legislatures and courts unclear as to whether rape
shield legislation actually may constrict defendants' rights to present evi-
dence or whether it merely echoes general evidentiary rules of rele-
vancy. 62 This ambiguity frustrates proponents of rape shield laws, who
had hoped to institute a policy to address the inadequacies with the gen-
eral relevancy approach.' 63
By rejecting the Michigan Court of Appeals' conclusion that a hear-
ing serves no useful purpose when evidence of prior sexual conduct be-
tween the defendant and the complainant is offered, the Court affirmed
the importance of in camera determinations of materiality and preju-
dice. 64 Yet the Court's failure to define fully the interests underlying
rape shield laws allows state courts to discount the impact of such evi-
dence on the complainant and society. 6 ' Furthermore, the Court of-
fered no guidance as to what factors courts should consider as they
measure the probative value of prior sexual conduct evidence against its
inflammatory nature. Judicial recognition of why evidence of prior sex-
ual conduct biases jurors"' and how sexism has shaped the law of
rape 67 would add meaning to the hearing requirement by identifying the
158. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected the notion that complainants might be sur-
prised by evidence of prior sexual conduct with the defendant. See supra note 21 and accom-
panying text.
159. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. at 1746.
160. Characterizing the state interest in this fashion places women in a special class in need
of protection, inviting criticism of rape shield laws from commentators. See supra notes 71-74
and accompanying text.
161. People v. Arenda, 416 Mich. 1, 10, 330 N.W.2d 814, 817 (1982).
162. For a discussion of state courts' confusion as to this issue, see supra notes 145-52 and
accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 55-84 and accompanying text.
164. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. at 1746-47. For a discussion of the Michigan Court of Appeals'
holding, see supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text. State courts have eroded the viability
of rape shield laws by failing to implement the policy calling for reduction of admissibility of
evidence of prior sexual conduct beyond the standard balancing of relevance against prejudice.
See Soshnick, supra note 5, at 659-85.
166. See WARSHAW, supra note 58, at 127-50; Lafree et al., supra note 69, at 397-402.
167. See supra notes 55-84 and accompanying text. See generally Estrich, supra note 4, at
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injustice it seeks to address.
Once the state has established the extent and nature of its interest,
Lucas solidly affirms the right of the trial judge to sanction defendants
who fail to comply by excluding all evidence offered in violation of the
rule. 168 The Court chose not to elaborate on the vague test suggested in
Taylor v. Illinois for determining when a preclusion sanction is war-
ranted.169 By describing the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision as a
per se rule prohibiting exclusion when evidence of prior sexual conduct
between the defendant and complainant is offered, the Court avoided dis-
cussing the standards for preclusion. 7 Specifically, the Court left it to
the Michigan Court of Appeals to determine whether preclusion is valid
when the violation was negligent and the prejudice to the prosecution can
easily be remedied.' 71
Limiting a defendant's fundamental right to present evidence and
confront the witnesses against him 172 should be accomplished by a clear
and uniform test to ensure that judicial recognition of his constitutional
rights does not vary by jurisdiction. 173 To further the truth-seeking func-
1094-1161 (tracing sexism in the law of rape from common-law traditions through attempted
reforms).
168. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. at 1748.
169. See id. The Taylor Court stated:
The integrity of the adversary process, which depends on both the presentation of
reliable evidence and the rejection of unreliable evidence, the interest in the fair and
efficient administration of justice, and the potential prejudice to the truth-determin-
ing function of the trial process must also weigh in the balance.
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 414-15 (1988).
See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Taylor test. Heider-
scheit has proposed that post-Taylor courts should decide if preclusion is warranted by consid-
ering whether (1) the discovery violation was willful, (2) the prosecution has been prejudiced
by the violation, (3) the circumstances of the violation indicate that the evidence offered has
been compromised, and (4) preclusion is needed for specific deterrence. Heiderscheit, supra
note 47, at 483-98. Heiderscheit interpreted Taylor to reject the following factors: (1) the
defendant's participation in the violation; (2) the effectiveness of less restrictive alternative
sanctions; and (3) the materiality of the precluded testimony. Id. at 498-508.
170. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. at 1748.
171. Id. See supra note 18 for a discussion of the likelihood that the violation was negli-
gent. Because the offer of proof was made at the start of the trial, the court could have delayed
the trial and conducted an in camera hearing to ensure protection of both the complainant and
prosecution. Heiderscheit found the lack of a clear definition of "willful" problematic and
argued that prejudice should continue to be a strong factor. Heiderscheit, supra note 47, at
489-90. Under this interpretation of the Taylor test, a defendant's negligent effort to offer
testimony at the start of the trial clearly does not warrant preclusion, provided it does not
surprise the prosecution.
172. For the development and definition of defendants' rights under the Confrontation
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment, see supra notes 85-111 and accompanying text.
173. After proposing a balancing test considering "the interest in the fair and efficient ad-
ministration of justice .... the potential prejudice to the truth-determining function of the trial
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tion of the discovery rules and to promote both specific and general de-
terrence, compliance must be enforced.17 It is also the goal of the trial
itself, however, to find the truth. While the admission of suspicious evi-
dence would taint that process,17 so too would the exclusion of relevant
evidence. Thus, the Court's failure to consider whether the alternate
sanctions suggested by Justice Brennan in his Taylor dissent 176 should
factor into the balancing test 17 7 results in the promotion of punishment
for failure to comply with the rape shield statute over the quest for truth.
The dissent in Lucas wrongly rejected the majority's characteriza-
tion of the Michigan Court of Appeals' holding as a per se rule, arguing
that the lower court's inarticulate expression of the relevancy issue gave
the majority no right to consider constitutional issues that were not
raised. 178  Read in context with People v. Williams,179 the Michigan
Court of Appeals' decision in Lucas held that the hearing requirement is
never constitutionally valid when applied to an offer of this type of evi-
dence. Preclusion, therefore, never would be an appropriate response to
the failure to comply with the statute; such a result is the equivalent of a
per se rule.'8 0
The Lucas Court missed the opportunity to articulate the goal of
rape shield legislation not only as protection of the complainant, but also
process," and the reasons for the noncompliance, the Court cited the standard used by one
federal circuit court as one example of a possible test. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 415 n.19 (citing
Fendler v. Goldsmith, 728 F.2d 1181, 1188-90 (9th Cir. 1983)). That test considered the effec-
tiveness of lesser sanctions, while the Taylor Court rejected lesser sanctions regardless of their
ability to prevent prejudice. Id. at 417; see supra note 143 for a complete description of the
factors considered by the court in Fendler.
174. The Taylor Court focused on specific deterrence through its attention to the lawyer's
past violations and the need to deter him from disobeying discovery rules in tile future. Taylor,
484 U.S. at 405. In both Lucas and Taylor the Court declined to address the weight, if any,
that should be given to general deterrence goals through which the threat of sanctions encour-
ages all attorneys to comply with discovery rules. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. at 1748; Taylor, 484 U.S.
at 416 n.22; Heiderscheit, supra note 47, at 497-98.
175. "Discovery, like cross-examination, minimizes the risk that a judgment will be predi-
cated on incomplete, misleading, or even deliberately fabricated testimony." Taylor, 484 U.S.
at 411-12.
176. Id. at 430-36 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see supra note 144 for discussion of the Taylor
dissent.
177. While the majority in Taylor did not address lesser sanctions in its evaluation, it did
cite a lower court's test that included consideration of lesser sanctions as an example of an
appropriate standard. Id. at 415 n.19 (citing Fendler v. Goldsmith, 728 F.2d 1181, 1188-90
(9th Cir. 1983)).
178. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. at 1749 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra notes 48-54 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the Lucas dissent.
179. 95 Mich. App. 1, 289 N.W.2d 863 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 416 Mich. 25, 330
N.W.2d 823 (1982); see supra note 21.
180. See supra note 21 for discussion of the interplay between Lucas and People v.
Williams.
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as the promotion of truth seeking. Because most rapes involve attacks
not by a stranger,' 8 ' but by someone the victim knows--often an ex-
boyfriend 82-- rape shield laws serve a very important function by recog-
nizing the prejudice and gender-bias inherent in the traditional rape de-
fense tactics and attempting to limit their influence. 183 These laws must
be vigorously enforced because vast problems still remain in judicial de-
terminations of rape and societal perceptions of sexuality.' 84 Unlike the
victims of any other crime, rape victims are expected to do more than say
"no.'1 85 Posting a sign negates consent to trespass; 86 "passive assent"
does not amount to consent to robbery.' 87 But rape victims are required
to act before the law will recognize their victimization.
Men and women have different perceptions of what types of actions
181. Professor Estrich labeled stranger rape the "traditional rape," often mistakenly re-
ferred to as "real rape." Estrich, supra note 4, at 1088, 1092-94.
182. One in four female college students surveyed identified themselves as victims of rape
or attempted rape. WARSHAW, supra note 58, at 11. Eighty-four percent of rape victims knew
their attacker and 57% of the rapes occurred on a date. Id. Acquaintance rape is "virtually
nonreported," yet estimates from rape counseling centers indicate that 70-80% of all rapes are
acquaintance rapes. Id. at 12.
183. See supra notes 55-84 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
We live.., in a time of changing sexual mores-and we are likely to [continue to do
so] for some time to come. In such times, the law can cling to the past or help move
us into the future. We can continue to enforce the most traditional views of male
aggressiveness and female passivity, continue to adhere to the "no means yes" philos-
ophy and to the broadest understanding of seduction, until and unless change over-
whelms us. That is not a neutral course, however; in taking it, the law (judges,
legislators, or prosecutors) not only reflects (a part of) society, but legitimates and
reenforces those views. . ..
Or we can use the law to move forward.
Estrich, supra note 4, at 1181.
185. Most rape statutes list as required elements the attacker's use of force and the victim's
active resistance. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. One study reports that women
must say "no" between three and 17 times before they are taken seriously. Interview with
Polly Guthrie, Education Coordinator, Orange County, North Carolina Rape Crisis Center
(Sept. 25, 1991). Fifty-nine percent of college males and 38% of college females agreed that
"[w]omen provoke rape by their appearance or behavior." WARSHAW, supra note 58, at 46.
Forty-one percent of college males and 27% of females agreed that "[a] woman should be
responsible for preventing her victimization in a rape." Id. Forty percent of college males and
18% of females agreed that "[t]he degree of a woman's resistance should be the major factor in
determining if a rape had occurred." Id.
186. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
187. See id. Professor Estrich has noted:
Instinctively, we may think it is easier in those cases to tell the difference between
consent and nonconsent. But if so, it is only because we are willing to presume that
men are entitled to access to women's bodies (as opposed to their houses or their
wallets), at least if they know them, and to accept male force in potentially "consen-
sual" sexual relations.
Estrich, supra note 4, at 1126.
19921 RAPE SHIELD LAWS 1621
suggest consent to sex.' 88 Our society teaches young people to accept
and expect a high level of coercion and pressure in a dating situation; this
often results in women feeling abused, but not raped.8 9 College students
consider the use of alcohol, drugs, and verbal coercion to "work[] a yes
out" as an acceptable means of seduction.' 90 While girls continue to be
trained not to initiate sex, boys continue to believe that being "led on"
creates a justification for rape. 9'
The defendant's vitally important right to present evidence need not
be sacrificed in an attempt to cure all of these evils. In camera hearings
afford the defendant an opportunity to proffer evidence without sacrific-
ing the goals of the rape shield statute. To be effective, however, exclu-
sion of evidence must be not be based on technicalities. Rape shield
legislation must be enforced, not only to prevent embarrassment or hu-
miliation of the complainant, but also to prevent gender bias from imped-
ing justice. 192 To effectuate these goals the state interest in rape shield
laws must be clearly defined. Restricting the admissibility of evidence of
prior sexual history based on an understanding of the sexism in both the
188. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text. Generally, men are likely to give a
more sexual interpretation to conversation and behavior than women. WARSHAW, supra note
58, at 41. Whereas women see dates as an opportunity to get to know a man, one study reports
that many men will decide whether they would like to have sex with a women before ever
approaching her for a date. Id. at 41-42.
189. Estrich, supra note 4, at 1166-67.
190. PEGGY R. SANDAY, FRATERNITY GANG RAPE 115 (1990).
"Sometimes a woman has to resist your advances to show how sincere she is. And
so, sometimes you've gotta help them along. You know she means no the first time,
but the third time she could say no all night and you know she doesn't mean it."
"Yeah, no always means no at the moment, but there might be other ways of ......
"Working a yes out?"
"Yeah!"
"Get her out on the dance floor, give her some drinks, talk to her for awhile."
"Agree to do something, sign the papers ...
"Ply her with alcohol."
[Laughter]
Id. at 113 (quoting fraternity brothers talking about "party sex").
191. WARSHAW, supra note 58, at 42-43.
192. In cases in which consent was at issue, one study found that jurors "were less likely to
believe in a defendant's guilt when the victim had reportedly engaged in sex outside marriage,
drank or used drugs, or had been acquainted with the defendant-however briefly-prior to
the alleged assault." Lafree et al., supra note 69, at 397. Thirty-two percent of college males
and eight percent of females agreed that "[i]t would do some women some gocd to get raped."
WARSHAV, supra note 58, at 46. Seventeen percent of college males and four percent of fe-
males agreed that "[i]n most cases, when a women was raped, she was asking for it." Id.
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law of rape and society will serve the criminal justice system's ultimate
goal: truth seeking.
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